Keep an AI agent from sharing your files with the internet

A file connector's most dangerous tool isn't read — it's the one that mints a public share link. Deny anonymous links and fence the folders that matter.

For: Teams exposing Google Drive, Box, or Dropbox to an AI assistant

A file store's read tools are the obvious worry, but the sharper edge is the share-link tool. One call turns a confidential document into an anonymous URL that anyone can open, with no further authentication — a link that outlives the session and the agent that made it.

These ingress policies close that path. guard-share-links-external (Box and Dropbox) denies anonymous and public links and downgrades scope to your organization, optionally injecting an expiry. fence-restricted-folders keeps the agent out of named sensitive paths entirely, and guard-acl-recon stops it from enumerating who-can-see-what as a reconnaissance step. For the reads that are allowed, redact-pii-egress masks personal data in file contents on the way back.

Layer the share-link deny with the folder fence and you get the useful default: the agent can read and summarize what it's allowed to, but it cannot widen access or hand a document to an outsider.